Challenging the received view, exploding popular myths ... and sometimes just having a rant. Topics covered on this blog will be mostly socio-economic issues, but are also likely to include some random deviations.
Sunday, March 4, 2012
The euro crisis and the fiscal compact treaty
Tuesday, December 6, 2011
Time to burst the austerity bubble
Meanwhile, Philip Lane is quoted in The Telegraph as saying "every [Irish] government for the next 20 years will have to keep cutting". As it is, we know the next two budgets will contain even more severe cuts than those being imposed right now. This is just what the government and "troika" have publicly admitted. What happens when the anticipated recovery (i.e. growth) doesn't materialize? More austerity?
It's time we all realized that the path we're on is unsustainable. Just as the boom was unsustainable - and on some level we all knew this, but allowed our instincts to be over-ridden by reassuring talk of "economic fundamentals" and "soft landings". The logic is simple and clear - this programme of austerity will not work. I think most people intuitively understand that. But we are allowing ourselves to be mollified by talk of restoring confidence, of "growing" exports and jobs. Just where are we going to export to, with the eurozone - and possibly the global economy - facing a sharp recession next year? Who is going to create jobs as domestic consumer demand continues to fall? The only thing we are growing right now is a generation of young people for export.
Stiglitz on the Euro Crisis
The prevailing view when the euro was established was that all that was required was fiscal discipline – no country’s fiscal deficit or public debt, relative to GDP, should be too large. But Ireland and Spain had budget surpluses and low debt before the crisis, which quickly turned into large deficits and high debt.
...
Without a common fiscal authority, the single market opened the way to tax competition – a race to the bottom to attract investment and boost output that could be freely sold throughout the EU.
Moreover, free labor mobility means that individuals can choose whether to pay their parents’ debts: young Irish can simply escape repaying the foolish bank-bailout obligations assumed by their government by leaving the country. Of course, migration is supposed to be good, as it reallocates labor to where its return is highest. But this kind of migration actually undermines productivity.
...
Public-sector cutbacks today do not solve the problem of yesterday’s profligacy; they simply push economies into deeper recessions. Europe’s leaders know this. They know that growth is needed. But, rather than deal with today’s problems and find a formula for growth, they prefer to deliver homilies about what some previous government should have done. This may be satisfying for the sermonizer, but it won’t solve Europe’s problems – and it won’t save the euro.
Sunday, November 20, 2011
The value of third level education and who should pay for it
Mass student protests took place in Dublin last week (see photos here) over expected increases in fees and cuts to maintenance grants in the forthcoming budget. Students feel betrayed by the apparent unwillingness of the Minister for Education, Ruairi Quinn of the Labour Party, to stand by his pre-election pledge not to raise fees or cut grants for third level students. The protestors also rightly question the wisdom of the proposed measures, given the likelihood that they could end up costing the government money as hard-pressed students are forced out of college and on to dole queues. Roughly one in four young people (17-25 year olds) in Ireland is unemployed, while the figure is more like one in three for young men (see here, here and here). The alternative to the dole queue is, of course, emigration. According to the CSO, 76,000 people left Ireland in the year to April 2011. Almost all of those leaving were aged 15-44 (see here).
Forcing young people out of education and on to dole queues - or on to planes - represents a personal tragedy for the young people and their families who are directly affected. It is also clearly not in the long-term social or economic interests of the country. However, the question inevitably arises as to how we should fund the third level sector in this country. Should free third level education - funded by the state - be offered to all those who wish to attend (and meet some basic minimum academic requirements)? Or should students themselves be asked to pay for their education through some kind of fee system? There appears to be an ideological (or at least political) aversion amongst the current government to the idea of fees based on the full economic cost of a third level education. However, the current approach of creeping fees (or "student contributions" to use the euphemism favoured by politicians) and cuts to maintenance grants, represent highly regressive mechanisms for plugging the funding shortfall. They also guarantee that only those who can afford the fees (and other associated costs of attending college - cost of living, books, foregone income etc.) will pursue third level education. Not only is this morally wrong, it is also economically inefficient - the most talented and those who are determined to make the most of their education are not afforded the opportunity to do so in such a system.
This matter of public funding for third level education is particularly pressing, given the government's current financial difficulties. A simple short-term solution would be not to repay these bonds, thus alleviating the need for such severe austerity in the forthcoming budget. However, even such a dramatic u-turn in government policy would not address the wider issue of the long-term sustainability of a third level sector that, because of Ireland's youthful demographics, will have to cope with large increases in the demands on its services over the coming years - that is, if we expect to continue offering third level courses to a large proportion of the population. Out of a population of almost 4.5 million in 2011, 1.25 million are aged 19 and under, with a particularly large cohort born in the last 5 years. Over the coming years, the college-age population cohort will increase considerably (see CSO figures here).
The protestors and their student leaders were understandably coy during the week about proposing any alternative to raising fees as a means of funding third level education. The USI president was right, however, in pointing out the limitations - particularly in the Irish context - of an Australian style system of student loans repaid through income tax (which appeared to be the preferred approach of the Fine Gael party - now in government - during its time in opposition). For one thing, such a system would only exacerbate the short-term funding crisis, as it would (presumably) involve removal of the existing "non-tuition" fees and would not see any returns to the exchequer until graduates began earning sufficiently high incomes to pay the implied graduate tax. Given youth unemployment rates, this could be quite a wait. There is also the issue of the international mobility of Irish young people and Ireland's history of emigration. Returns (societal or economic) to any investment in education, are dependent - at the very least - on people remaining in the country.
Any debate on the appropriate way to fund education must also consider the value of education, both to the individual and to society. A number of recent analyses have begun to question the value - from the student's perspective - of the enormous investment involved in attempting to acquire a third level qualification (e.g. this New York Review of Books article). In the US, where students pay extremely high fees, young people graduating from university are leaving with worse job prospects and higher debts than ever before (see this Mother Jones article). Worse again, many leave before graduating - with a heavy debt burden and no qualification to show for it.
Over the medium to long-term we must consider what role the third level sector should play in our society, and what sort of graduates (and in what numbers) will be needed or desired in future. Will churning out large numbers of undergraduate degrees, masters and PhDs deliver the hallowed 'Knowledge Economy' of so many political speeches and government documents? As Paul Krugman argued back in 1996 - in what already seems like a highly prescient piece of futurology - "when something becomes abundant, it also becomes cheap. A world awash in information will be a world in which information per se has very little market value."
Much has been made recently of rising income inequality in rich countries - the US in particular - in part thanks to the issues raised by the Occupy movement. Many economists have - mistakenly it seems - linked rising income inequality to the proliferation of technology, leading to higher returns to education. In fact, most of the rise in inequality appears to have been driven by the runaway increase in incomes for the top 1% (see here). For everyone else - including the majority of college graduates - real incomes have not risen over the last 20 or 30 years. The Occupy slogan "we are the 99%" appears to have captured the reality of modern income inequality.
So perhaps the debate ultimately comes back to a question about what kind of society we wish to live in. Certainly, if we wanted to we could decide that a third level education represents a basic right of all citizens and as such should be funded by the state. This would have to be paid for - through taxation of one kind or another, or reduced spending elsewhere - but is certainly not beyond the realms of possibility, as politicians might conveniently argue.
Education is undoubtedly a fundamental right. But should that extend to third level education? Education is also a public good - an investment (as opposed to a cost) to which the returns from a societal point of view far outweigh the benefits to the individual. As such, there is plenty of justification for public investment in education. However, the scientific evidence indicates that the greatest returns to investing in education accrue to investment in early childhood (see here). This is also likely to be the most progressive form of educational investment - given that a child's prospects for educational attainment appear to be determined from a very early age. It is worth noting that the free fees for third level system in Ireland does not appear to have had much of an impact on the participation rates for different socio-economic groups.
So while there is no denying the desirability of significant public investment in education, to the extent that this is constrained by available resources, it should be concentrated on early childhood interventions. The question, then, is whether a free fees third level system is a luxury we can no longer afford, or a social programme we would be poorer without.
The meaning of crisis
Crisis is a term rooted in Greek tragedy, meaning “a decisive moment or turning point in a dramatic action”. It is a moment of suffering and confusion, a time when everything that seemed to be fixed becomes suddenly unstable. The events of November 2010, with things spinning wildly out of control, certainly meet this definition. But the point of crisis in Greek tragedy is that it leads to catharsis, a sense of things being purged.
Václav Havel, then president of the Czech Republic and himself a distinguished dramatist, used precisely this metaphor while addressing his nation in 1997, when it had been hit by the twin scandals of political corruption and a banking bubble. “However unpleasant and stressful and even dangerous what we are going through may be, it can also be instructive and a force for good because it can call forth a catharsis, the intended outcome of ancient Greek tragedy. That means a feeling of profound purification and redemption. A feeling of newborn hope. A feeling of liberation.”
From that perspective, a cynic might be tempted to remark that the Irish are not even capable of having a proper crisis. We’ve had the unpleasant, painful and dangerous bit – and we’re going to go on having it for the foreseeable future. But we don’t do catharsis.
- Fintan O'Toole, Irish Times, 19 November 2011.
Monday, December 20, 2010
Learning our Lessons
Stephen Collins makes the now standard error of blaming wide swathes of Irish society for our current woes ("Bailout teaches what we should have learned years ago", 4 December). We will be living with the consequences of decisions taken by a reckless minority in this country for many years to come. However, we should be very clear about one thing: this bailout and the concomitant loss of sovereignty, has been precipitated by the actions of private banks - both Irish and others - actions which our present government and it's European 'partners' now expect Irish people to take responsibility for.
Is mise,
Tom McDermott
Monday, December 6, 2010
Breaking down the "bailout"
Phoenix magazine had a very clear breakdown of the "bailout" in its most recent issue. (I couldn't find it online - you need a subscription - so I'll just quote some of the key points here)
Total borrowing involved in bailout: 60.5bn euro (the remainder comes from Ireland's own funds - pension reserve and whatever cash the NTMA has stored up).
Of this:
- 22.5bn is from IMF at interest rates of around 3-4%
- 17.5bn from the European Financial Stability Facility
- 22.5bn from the European Financial Stability Mechanism
EFSF is mainly German and French money. It's a special vehicle set up to fund EU members in need of restructuring funds. It operates in conjunction with the German Debt Management Office.
According to the framework agreement which set up the EFSF, the interest rate to be charged is "intended to cover the cost of funding incurred by EFSF and shall include a margin [ie a profit] which shall provide remuneration for the guarantors". On top of this there is a service fee to cover operational costs and various fees, which is charged upfront at 0.5% of the total loan (ie 88m).
The rate applied is based on "the rates corresponding to swap rates for the relevant maturities" (today approx 2.7%) plus "a charge of three percent for maturities up to three years and an extrra one percent per year for loans longer than three years" (ie 6.7% - making a profit for the EFSF of 4bn over the lifetime of the, ahem, "bailout"!!!).
It gets worse.
"The anticipated margin that would accrue on each loan to its scheduled maturity date shall be deducted from the cash amount to be remitted to the borrower in respect of loan. The service fee and the net present value of the anticipated margin ... will be deducted from the cash amount remitted to the borrower in respect of each loan but shall not reduce the principal amount of such loan that the borrower is liable to repay and on which interest accrues under the relevant loan". [that quote also comes from the framework agreement].
(ie they take their 4bn of the 17.5bn they are lending us before the money ever gets to Dublin, while charging interest on the full amount!).
EFSM money will be charged at 5.7%, if we draw down the full amount. (Greece paid 5.2%).
Ireland's so-called "bailout"
What's happening now is a variation on what I complained about previously (in my unpublished letter to the Irish Times, posted here). Rather than using the "we all partied" line (and what a gem that is -
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YK7w6fXoYxo) the line now is this crap about the state running out of money, having no alternative etc., with Fianna Fail taking some culpability for some mistakes somewhere in the distant past (but sure the others would've done the same anyway), and ultimately we should be grateful to our Euro "partners" for bailing us out of this fine mess we've gotten ourselves into.This is all a web of lies, deception etc. The only reason markets stopped lending to Ireland in the last few weeks is because of the bank debt that has been nationalised. WE CANT AFFORD TO REPAY THIS. The markets know this. Our banks have been shut out of international markets - because their losses on property etc. have been rising beyond any "worst case scenarios" previously envisaged, and because they had become entirely reliant on money from the ECB (this is its role remember: CB = lender of last resort to the financial system, so let's not feel too grateful/ashamed for requiring this facility either). Then the markets got really spooked when Merkel started talking about making bondholders share the pain without giving any details.
So Ireland was pressured into taking the bailout in an attempt to "stuff" the banks with cash (over-capitalise them is what Gov Honohan called it) and convince markets this was the end of it so they would start lending to our banks again. The whole point was to avoid "contagion" to the other Euro countries in trouble. This hasn't worked. Big surprise. The bit about using this money to fund the Irish state is a total sideshow.
We do need to make a big "fiscal correction" over the next few years, but that is totally doable.
So, yes I believe we do have an alternative. As David McWilliams has been saying, what we need is a new "bank resolution" law (I don't think any such legislation currently exists in Ireland, so creating an entirely new one should be straightforward). The law would simply state that in Ireland, when a bank becomes insolvent (the Irish CB could be allowed to decide when this is so) that bank's bondholders must share the burden. Specifically we would create a debt-equity swap mechanism. Bondholders who are owed money by an insolvent bank will have their debt converted into equity (or shares in the bank). The bank doesn't disappear. In fact the bank is now significantly healthier as it has rid itself of debt. Depositors would have to be protected by some sort of insurance. (The Irish government already guarantees anything up to EUR100k. I'm not sure if we would need European cooperation to guarantee bigger deposits.)
The bit about all the medium sized firms imploding in such a scenario is probably exaggerated. Our banking system wouldn't disappear over night. As it is, small firms are having a really hard time getting credit because whatever money goes into the banks is being used to pay down their debts and/or build up these extra capital requirements that are supposed to make them look like good banks again.
So the banks' bondholders would suffer losses. But they expect this, because it will become European law in 2013. Anyway, even if we piss off some investors, so what?! Would the markets ever lend to Ireland again? Of course they would. The 'markets' are not a single entity with some sort of institutional memory. They are made up of lots of different investors all over the world. Investors do not generally hold grudges. They make decisions based on future prospects of risk/return. Even if some of the specific individuals that get burned in this scenario did decide to take it personally and never lend to Ireland again it wouldn't matter. Ireland is small. So are our funding needs by international standards. There are plenty of more investor fish in the sea, so to speak.
An Irish state that is rid of its bank debt obligations would represent a very attractive investment (especially at the kind of rates we are paying for this so-called "bailout"). We will still have low taxes by European standards (even after we get our fiscal house in order). We have a young, well educated workforce. We have a hugely successful manufacturing and internationally-traded services sector, with highly profitable divisions of some of the world's biggest companies based here. We have a lot going for us. Yes this course of action involves some reputational damage, but would that really be worse than the reputational damage already done by fiscal and economic mis-management? And the reputational damage of having to be "bailed out"?? Distinguishing between the Irish state and the Irish banks might actually be a good way to begin restoring our damaged reputation overseas. Anyway, a damaged reputation (and some bruised egos) is a lower price to pay than the costs associated with this bailout and our continued commitment to pay for whatever losses are accrued by our reckless banks.