David Cameron probably has a vision ... but I don't know what it is

In a recent poll in Britain, 55% of people agreed with the statement that "David Cameron probably has a vision for the country ... but I don't know what it is."

- as reported in the Guardian, 6 October, 2011.

Tony Judt on Captive Minds

The following is an extract from Tony Judt's essay "Captive Minds" in the NYRB:

Today, we can still hear sputtering echoes of the attempt to reignite the cold war around a crusade against “Islamo-fascism.” But the true mental captivity of our time lies elsewhere. Our contemporary faith in “the market” rigorously tracks its radical nineteenth-century doppelgänger—the unquestioning belief in necessity, progress, and History. Just as the hapless British Labour chancellor in 1929–1931, Philip Snowden, threw up his hands in the face of the Depression and declared that there was no point opposing the ineluctable laws of capitalism, so Europe’s leaders today scuttle into budgetary austerity to appease “the markets.”

But “the market”—like “dialectical materialism”—is just an abstraction: at once ultra-rational (its argument trumps all) and the acme of unreason (it is not open to question). It has its true believers—mediocre thinkers by contrast with the founding fathers, but influential withal; its fellow travelers—who may privately doubt the claims of the dogma but see no alternative to preaching it; and its victims, many of whom in theUS especially have dutifully swallowed their pill and proudly proclaim the virtues of a doctrine whose benefits they will never see.

Above all, the thrall in which an ideology holds a people is best measured by their collective inability to imagine alternatives. We know perfectly well that untrammeled faith in unregulated markets kills: the rigid application of what was until recently the “Washington consensus” in vulnerable developing countries—with its emphasis on tight fiscal policy, privatization, low tariffs, and deregulation—has destroyed millions of livelihoods. Meanwhile, the stringent “commercial terms” on which vital pharmaceuticals are made available has drastically reduced life expectancy in many places. But in Margaret Thatcher’s deathless phrase, “there is no alternative.”

It was in just such terms that communism was presented to its beneficiaries following World War II; and it was because History afforded no apparent alternative to a Communist future that so many of Stalin’s foreign admirers were swept into intellectual captivity. But when Miłosz published The Captive Mind, Western intellectuals were still debating among genuinely competitive social models—whether social democratic, social market, or regulated market variants of liberal capitalism. Today, despite the odd Keynesian protest from below the salt, a consensus reigns.

For Miłosz, “the man of the East cannot take Americans seriously because they have never undergone the experiences that teach men how relative their judgments and thinking habits are.” This is doubtless so and explains the continuing skepticism of the Eastern European in the face of Western innocence. But there is nothing innocent about Western (and Eastern) commentators’ voluntary servitude before the new pan-orthodoxy. Many of them, Ketman-like, know better but prefer not to raise their heads above the parapet. In this sense at least, they have something truly in common with the intellectuals of the Communist age. One hundred years after his birth, fifty-seven years after the publication of his seminal essay, Miłosz’s indictment of the servile intellectual rings truer than ever: “his chief characteristic is his fear of thinking for himself.”

Letter to FT on Lomborg's false dichotomy

The following letter was published in the Financial Times today (20 December, 2010), in response to this article by Bjorn Lomborg (from the FT, 9 December, 2010).

Sir,

In the article “Time for Europe to show real vision on climate” (FT, 10^th December), Bjorn Lomborg argues that "We will never succeed in making fossil fuels so expensive that no one wants them [...] Instead, we should make green energy so cheap that everyone wants it". There is an inherent inconsistency in this line of reasoning, as the decision to switch from burning fossil fuels to some alternative depends on the relative prices of each.

The figures quoted in the article seem to suggest that emissions reduction is very expensive, while developing green tech alternatives would be relatively cheap. These cannot be simultaneously true. If cheap alternative energy sources are developed then emissions reduction becomes cheap as a consequence. Incidentally, it is notable that no reference is made to the assumptions and uncertainties inherent in the types of estimates to which the author refers.

As regards his policy recommendations, Lomborg advocates supply side solutions to climate change without specifying how the necessary investment might be stimulated. Does he envisage governments giving large-scale subsidies to the green energy sector? Such schemes are unlikely to be cheap.

Private sector investment in green energy alternatives is constrained partly by uncertainty, which pushes up the risk premium required by investors. One way of reducing this uncertainty - and thus stimulating greater investment - is to formulate more coherent climate policy, something which Lomborg seems to think is no longer worthwhile.

The simple, but false, dichotomous interpretation of the available policy options presented in this article may be a good way of getting media attention, but it is not a good way of thinking about complex socio-economic or scientific policy issues.

Yours etc.

Tom McDermott & Stefano F. Verde, Trinity College Dublin

Tim Laing, LSE

and Aurelie Mejean, CIRED, Paris

Update: Lomborg's response to our letter is here.

Learning our Lessons

Letter to the Irish Times, 5 December 2010 (not published)

A chara,

Stephen Collins makes the now standard error of blaming wide swathes of Irish society for our current woes ("Bailout teaches what we should have learned years ago", 4 December). We will be living with the consequences of decisions taken by a reckless minority in this country for many years to come. However, we should be very clear about one thing: this bailout and the concomitant loss of sovereignty, has been precipitated by the actions of private banks - both Irish and others - actions which our present government and it's European 'partners' now expect Irish people to take responsibility for.

Is mise,
Tom McDermott

Breaking down the "bailout"

Phoenix magazine had a very clear breakdown of the "bailout" in its most recent issue. (I couldn't find it online - you need a subscription - so I'll just quote some of the key points here)

Total borrowing involved in bailout: 60.5bn euro (the remainder comes from Ireland's own funds - pension reserve and whatever cash the NTMA has stored up).

Of this:

- 22.5bn is from IMF at interest rates of around 3-4%

- 17.5bn from the European Financial Stability Facility

- 22.5bn from the European Financial Stability Mechanism

EFSF is mainly German and French money. It's a special vehicle set up to fund EU members in need of restructuring funds. It operates in conjunction with the German Debt Management Office.

According to the framework agreement which set up the EFSF, the interest rate to be charged is "intended to cover the cost of funding incurred by EFSF and shall include a margin [ie a profit] which shall provide remuneration for the guarantors". On top of this there is a service fee to cover operational costs and various fees, which is charged upfront at 0.5% of the total loan (ie 88m).

The rate applied is based on "the rates corresponding to swap rates for the relevant maturities" (today approx 2.7%) plus "a charge of three percent for maturities up to three years and an extrra one percent per year for loans longer than three years" (ie 6.7% - making a profit for the EFSF of 4bn over the lifetime of the, ahem, "bailout"!!!).

It gets worse.

"The anticipated margin that would accrue on each loan to its scheduled maturity date shall be deducted from the cash amount to be remitted to the borrower in respect of loan. The service fee and the net present value of the anticipated margin ... will be deducted from the cash amount remitted to the borrower in respect of each loan but shall not reduce the principal amount of such loan that the borrower is liable to repay and on which interest accrues under the relevant loan". [that quote also comes from the framework agreement].

(ie they take their 4bn of the 17.5bn they are lending us before the money ever gets to Dublin, while charging interest on the full amount!).

EFSM money will be charged at 5.7%, if we draw down the full amount. (Greece paid 5.2%).

Ireland's so-called "bailout"

What's happening now is a variation on what I complained about previously (in my unpublished letter to the Irish Times, posted here). Rather than using the "we all partied" line (and what a gem that is -

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YK7w6fXoYxo) the line now is this crap about the state running out of money, having no alternative etc., with Fianna Fail taking some culpability for some mistakes somewhere in the distant past (but sure the others would've done the same anyway), and ultimately we should be grateful to our Euro "partners" for bailing us out of this fine mess we've gotten ourselves into.

This is all a web of lies, deception etc. The only reason markets stopped lending to Ireland in the last few weeks is because of the bank debt that has been nationalised. WE CANT AFFORD TO REPAY THIS. The markets know this. Our banks have been shut out of international markets - because their losses on property etc. have been rising beyond any "worst case scenarios" previously envisaged, and because they had become entirely reliant on money from the ECB (this is its role remember: CB = lender of last resort to the financial system, so let's not feel too grateful/ashamed for requiring this facility either). Then the markets got really spooked when Merkel started talking about making bondholders share the pain without giving any details.

So Ireland was pressured into taking the bailout in an attempt to "stuff" the banks with cash (over-capitalise them is what Gov Honohan called it) and convince markets this was the end of it so they would start lending to our banks again. The whole point was to avoid "contagion" to the other Euro countries in trouble. This hasn't worked. Big surprise. The bit about using this money to fund the Irish state is a total sideshow.

We do need to make a big "fiscal correction" over the next few years, but that is totally doable.

So, yes I believe we do have an alternative. As David McWilliams has been saying, what we need is a new "bank resolution" law (I don't think any such legislation currently exists in Ireland, so creating an entirely new one should be straightforward). The law would simply state that in Ireland, when a bank becomes insolvent (the Irish CB could be allowed to decide when this is so) that bank's bondholders must share the burden. Specifically we would create a debt-equity swap mechanism. Bondholders who are owed money by an insolvent bank will have their debt converted into equity (or shares in the bank). The bank doesn't disappear. In fact the bank is now significantly healthier as it has rid itself of debt. Depositors would have to be protected by some sort of insurance. (The Irish government already guarantees anything up to EUR100k. I'm not sure if we would need European cooperation to guarantee bigger deposits.)

The bit about all the medium sized firms imploding in such a scenario is probably exaggerated. Our banking system wouldn't disappear over night. As it is, small firms are having a really hard time getting credit because whatever money goes into the banks is being used to pay down their debts and/or build up these extra capital requirements that are supposed to make them look like good banks again.

So the banks' bondholders would suffer losses. But they expect this, because it will become European law in 2013. Anyway, even if we piss off some investors, so what?! Would the markets ever lend to Ireland again? Of course they would. The 'markets' are not a single entity with some sort of institutional memory. They are made up of lots of different investors all over the world. Investors do not generally hold grudges. They make decisions based on future prospects of risk/return. Even if some of the specific individuals that get burned in this scenario did decide to take it personally and never lend to Ireland again it wouldn't matter. Ireland is small. So are our funding needs by international standards. There are plenty of more investor fish in the sea, so to speak.

An Irish state that is rid of its bank debt obligations would represent a very attractive investment (especially at the kind of rates we are paying for this so-called "bailout"). We will still have low taxes by European standards (even after we get our fiscal house in order). We have a young, well educated workforce. We have a hugely successful manufacturing and internationally-traded services sector, with highly profitable divisions of some of the world's biggest companies based here. We have a lot going for us. Yes this course of action involves some reputational damage, but would that really be worse than the reputational damage already done by fiscal and economic mis-management? And the reputational damage of having to be "bailed out"?? Distinguishing between the Irish state and the Irish banks might actually be a good way to begin restoring our damaged reputation overseas. Anyway, a damaged reputation (and some bruised egos) is a lower price to pay than the costs associated with this bailout and our continued commitment to pay for whatever losses are accrued by our reckless banks.

An open letter on Ireland's proposed Climate Change Bill

A chara,

Climate change is a real and significant threat to human welfare, particularly in the poorest parts of the world. While an effective 'solution' to this threat will require global cooperation over a sustained period of time, this is no excuse for not acting now to begin the process of reducing our dependence on carbon-intensive activities.

Ireland has a great record of leading the world in initiatives aimed at reducing global poverty. This work should be complemented and reinforced by action on climate change. Ireland could take the lead in demonstrating to other rich countries (and the rapidly developing 'emerging economies') that reducing carbon emissions can be achieved without jeopardising economic or social welfare. In fact, these goals can be enhanced by such initiatives. This is not only the morally right thing to do, it is also in our interests. Such leadership would help to restore Ireland's image internationally, which has been so tarnished by the excesses, greed and corruption of our recent economic boom and bust. At the same time, intelligent climate legislation could provide an additional source of revenue for government, while potentially improving our competitiveness over the long-term.

Unfortunately, the proposed Climate Change Bill produced by The Oireachtas Joint Committee on Climate Change and Energy Security (and due to be debated in the Dail today, Thursday), will not achieve any of these worthy goals. The proposed bill would legislate for ambitious emissions reduction targets, with the Taoiseach responsible for ensuring that these targets are achieved. The Taoiseach would also indicate what levels of emissions he/she expects each year. How is the Taoiseach to predict annual emissions levels or to enforce any such medium to long-term targets? This is equivalent to imposing legislation that requires the Taoiseach to predict levels of economic growth each year, or somehow to enforce medium to long-term economic targets.

Unless this legislation envisages an entirely new, centrally-planned economic system in this country, I do not see how its objectives can be achieved.

Legislation of this nature will do two things:

1) It provides a convenient sound-bite for politicians to hide behind. It is relatively easy to say "we have proposed/introduced legislation that will force emissions to fall by x% by 2050" etc. without actually specifying how such targets will be achieved (i.e. without having to stand up to various interest groups who may stand to lose from specific climate-related legislation).

2) Such a law obliges the presiding government to make various interventions to attempt to reduce GHG emissions. Crucially, however, it leaves the choice of specific interventions as a purely political decision. How will the government of the day decide how and where to reduce emissions? On what basis? We surely should be sufficiently well chastened in this country by recent experience of political interventions in the property sector (in the form of tax breaks etc.) to understand what a dangerous scenario this type of legislation will create.

We should not allow politicians the convenience of meaningless targets to hide behind, or the opportunity to use climate change legislation as a means of making themselves and their friends better off in the next round of crony-political-economy.

Setting ambitious long-term targets might sound good, but in reality this does not provide any greater certainty to businesses, investors, or consumers, simply because such targets are purely aspirational and are not credible without specific measures to achieve them.

The optimal climate change policy from both an equity and an efficiency perspective is to place a tax on carbon emissions, and allow people to choose the best way for them of reducing carbon dependency. This would obviously have revenue raising potential - revenue that is so desperately needed right now - while any potential threat to vulnerable people could be mitigated by using part of the revenue raised to provide reimbursements to those on low-incomes. Taxes are never popular, but the people of Ireland are acutely aware right now that taxes must rise. In every crisis there lies opportunity. If only we had the courage to embrace this one.

Is mise,

Tom McDermott

Update: A version of this letter was published on the irisheconomy.ie blog on 11 November 2010.